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Introduction 
There have been broad discussions on theories of social work and social pedagogy in Germany for 
more than 120 years now (Lambers, 2013). These discussions were connected to attempts to 
establish an academic discipline in Germany’s higher education. Around 1970, these attempts were 
finally successful, with courses established at regular German universities as well as at Germany’s 
so-called universities of applied sciences (Fachhochschulen). The label ‘social work’ was mostly 
used for courses taught at Germany’s universities of applied sciences. The traditional universities 
(Universitäten) mostly used the theoretical label ‘social pedagogy’ for their degree programmes, 
This paper makes an attempt to interpret the German debate on social 
pedagogy as a multifaceted perspective that, whilst diverse in its 
assumptions about what social pedagogy is, also shows a striking 
commonality. To exemplify this, we intentionally focus on dominant 
theories of social pedagogy in Germany, which aim to directly answer the 
question of what social pedagogy is. However, in attempting to contribute 
to a clearer understanding of social pedagogy as a theoretical 
phenomenon, it is not sufficient to describe these theories and the various 
ideas of social pedagogy they generate. Instead, it is essential to 
deconstruct how these theories reify their numerous assumptions on social 
pedagogy. We will therefore argue that it is worthwhile not to focus too 
narrowly on what is reified as social pedagogy in dominant theories in 
Germany. Instead, we suggest a careful analysis of how social pedagogy is 
commonly theorized. Our hypothesis is that, in Germany, prominent 
theories of social pedagogy reify social pedagogy by means of a 
distinctively ontological mode of reification. This mode we see as a common 
pattern of dominant theories of social pedagogy in Germany, regardless of 
the different objects of social pedagogy produced by these theories. Beyond 
a mere critique, we intend to also explain this mode at the end of our paper 
and raise the question whether it might point to a broader concept of how 
theories of social pedagogy and social work are usually generated in 
Germany and beyond. 
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drawing on a tradition of thought that was rooted in some of the philosophical approaches of the 
late 19th and early 20th century. These had had attempted to react to the social issues and upheavals 
of the 19th century by means of a pedagogical approach and with reference to educational 
understandings (see Sünker and Braches-Chyrek, 2009; for a more detailed overview see Dollinger, 
2006; with a broader focus on educational sciences see Veith, 2007). 
Regardless of institutional success, Germany’s academic discourse around social pedagogy and 
social work has, over the decades, been somewhat defensive. To a certain degree, this might have 
resulted from the work of German academics coming from general education/pedagogy, who have 
regularly commented on the academic state of social pedagogy and social work studies, which they 
have typified as an academic sub-discipline (Lenzen, 1994; Ehrenspeck, 1998), if any. This kind of 
understanding was nurtured by the fact that at most German universities social pedagogy could 
only be established as a major degree within the pedagogic or educational sciences. In line with this 
structure, the idea of social pedagogy as a sub-discipline has been reproduced even in research 
literature (Thaler, 2013). From an outside perspective it is furthermore remarkable that not only 
academic competitors from other (sub-)disciplines, but particularly those academics who are social 
pedagogy scholars themselves, and therefore the very people who succeeded in establishing social 
pedagogy as an academic discipline, have obviously continued to doubt whether a full 
academization of social pedagogy can actually prevail (Niemeyer, 2003; Dewe and Otto, 2011). 
Alongside these doubts not so much a political, but also a distinctively theoretical debate on what 
social pedagogy is has been established. This debate is strongly related to an overall discussion of 
what the presumable ‘core identity’ of social pedagogy in practice might be (Thiersch and Treptow, 
2011).  
Meanwhile, the international Anglophone debate has also started to reflect more broadly on social 
pedagogy (Kornbeck and Rosendahl Jensen, 2009; Kornbeck and Rosendahl Jensen, 2011; 
Schugurensky and Silver, 2013; Stephens, 2013). This reflection has not strictly been limited to a 
reception1 of the German debate but very much focused on its previous results when considering 
the question of how social pedagogy can be defined as a special approach to both understand social 
work practice (Gustavson, Hermanson and Hämäläinen, 2003; Hämäläinen, 2003) and to enhance it 
(Smith and Whyte, 2008; Petrie and Cameron, 2009; Petrie et al., 2009; Coussée et al., 2010; 
Hämäläinen, 2012). 
As we aim to show below, it might be risky though for the international debate to rely too much on 
the previous outcomes of the debate in Germany. We argue that it is necessary to scrutinize this 
debate very carefully in order to dissect what the theoretical concept of social pedagogy in 
Germany might be about. Once deconstructed, the debate on theories of social pedagogy in 
Germany can still be of decent use for understanding not only what social pedagogy is, but maybe 
even for explaining a broader concept of social work theory. 
Our argument uses four steps to answer our basic question: ‘How do theories of social pedagogy in 
Germany work, to what extent do they actually vary in the ways they work, and why do they work 
the way they work?’ In part 1, we briefly sketch out how earlier debates on theories of social 
pedagogy identify the fact that various theories of social pedagogy end up with different ideas of 
what social pedagogy ‘is’ as an epistemological problem. We will make the point that this fact is not 
an epistemological problem but a contingent and normative one, if any, produced by earlier meta-
perspectives on social pedagogy in Germany. We therefore outline an alternative meta-perspective 
                                                        
 
1 As far as theories of social pedagogy from Germany go, it indeed seems adequate to speak of an international 
reception and not so much of an internationalisation, as – interestingly enough – contemporary German authors did not 
significantly contribute to the international debate on social pedagogy in the beginning and are just about to keep up 
with the development (Walther, 2014: 90). 
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on German social pedagogic theories. This meta-perspective examines the variety of what existing 
theories ‘reify’2 as social pedagogy (see part 2 of our argument), and also focuses on what all of 
these theories seem to have in common: they all reify their ideas of social pedagogy in a comparable 
manner (see step 3 of our argument). Fourthly, we conclude that this commonality reveals how 
social pedagogy construes what it describes in the act of description. In other words: Social 
pedagogy can be understood as a distinctive mode of reification that aims to describe a field of 
interest in a distinctive way. As we will show, this way has proved to be both functional and 
dysfunctional at the same time. At the end of our article, we raise the question whether what we 
have tried to demonstrate here might also be valid for a broader analysis of the international 
debate on social work theory. 
 
1. Do various ideas of social pedagogy represent an analytical problem? 
It has often been mentioned that German approaches of ’social pedagogy’ reflect a somewhat 
undefined concept, which attempts to connect several historically changing notions in one word 
(Wilhelm, 1961; Mollenhauer, 1966; Erikson and Markström, 2000; Hämäläinen, 2012). Not only in 
a historical perspective, but also in the current state of German debate on social pedagogy, this 
judgment is seemingly compelling. At least this is the case as long as one describes social pedagogy 
as something that has to be defined as a unique matter. Presupposing this, the theoretical debate on 
social pedagogy in Germany is disappointing as there is a whole variety of approaches here which 
try to define in relatively different ways what social pedagogy is or should be, and each of these 
approaches uses rather dissimilar auxiliary tools to do so. The approaches vary a lot in terms of 
what they detect as the main object of social pedagogy on the one hand, and in terms of what they 
see as a core identity of social pedagogy ‘in practice’ on the other hand. 
Therefore, the debate has often been summarised as a hopeless adventure trying to find out about 
the ‘real’ identity of social pedagogy (Rauschenbach, 1991: 1). This is also because. in the German-
speaking debate, the term ‘social pedagogy’ still characterises at least three things: 
 An academic discipline under the roof of pedagogy/educational sciences, 
 A conglomeration of theoretical perspectives on fields and practices of education, which 
particularly emphasize their social and societal conditions, 
 A collective term for a rather disparate professional field, which Germans traditionally identify 
as Kinder- und Jugendhilfe (child and youth welfare). 
Thus, the term social pedagogy appears to represent a rather blurry terminology, and at the same 
time a very indistinct idea of one or even more professional fields. Furthermore, it has done all of 
that in a historically somewhat inconsistent way. Against this background, it seems hardly 
surprising that the German debate on social pedagogy can feel rather discouraging for those who 
are actively involved in it and that the question of social pedagogy’s ‘identity’ has survived amongst 
analysts until today (Füssenhäuser and Thiersch, 2005; Lorenz, 2008; Dewe and Otto, 2011; 
Füssenhäuser and Thiersch, 2011; Thiersch and Treptow, 2011). 
What makes things even more confusing is that meanwhile the debate in Germany no longer 
distinguishes consistently between the two terms ‘social pedagogy’ and ‘social work’ (Kessl, 2013: 
25). Therefore, we would like to conclude two things at this point. First, it would obviously not be 
worth staying too close to the term ‘social pedagogy’ alone in attempting to learn more about how it 
                                                        
 
2 By using the expression ‘reification’, we stress the constructivist idea that there ‘are’ no epistemological ‘matters’ 
apart from their description. In other words, we assume that every way of describing a ‘matter of fact’ is at the same 
time a way of generating it (Krohn and Küppers, 1990). 
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is generally understood. Second, even a comparative approach focusing on commonalities and 
differences between various theories of social pedagogy and social work in Germany would fail if it 
were only to compare the multiple results of reifications that these theories generate. 
In what follows though, we do not take these circumstances as normatively problematic matters. 
Therefore, it is not our goal either to answer the questions arising from them through any counter-
argument about which of the existing theoretical reifications of social pedagogy is ‘correct’. Instead, 
we will take the current theories of social pedagogy in Germany as our basic research material. In 
other words, we take the position that in order to understand what ‘social pedagogy’ in Germany 
‘is’, it is worthwhile to accept the variety of reifications of social pedagogy generated by German 
theories of social pedagogy as an empirical phenomenon. As such, this variety might represent 
inconsistencies and diversities of theoretical assumptions about social pedagogy but does not 
present an epistemological problem hindering an academic observer of social pedagogy from 
drawing conclusions on social pedagogy in Germany. To show both the variety and the common 
outlines of the debate on what social pedagogy is in Germany, it is important to describe both what 
existing theories of social pedagogy reify as social pedagogy (see 2), and how they do it (see 3). 
 
2. The variety of social pedagogies within contemporary German theories of 
social pedagogy 
In what follows we would first like to demonstrate the variety of what theories of social pedagogy 
in Germany have generated as social pedagogy. To do so, we will refer briefly to four approaches 
that are currently rather dominant and have been continuously quoted with regard to the state of 
recent theory building in German social pedagogy (Füssenhäuser and Thiersch, 2005; 
Füssenhäuser, 2011b; Rauschenbach and Züchner, 2011). What they all have in common is mainly 
the ambition to generate a theory, which intends to describe, analyse and explain ‘social pedagogy’ 
as a whole. This ambition is regularly marked in a twofold manner: On the one hand, they explicitly 
describe themselves as ‘theory’; on the other hand, they claim to give a valid representation of 
social pedagogy as something specific and distinct (like, for example, to be distinguished from 
education in school or in the family). In this sense, they differ basically from the variety of other 
approaches also lively in the theoretical discourse related to social work issues, such as approaches 
of welfare state theories, theories of socialization, psychoanalysis, labelling approach and social 
system theory (see Payne, 2005). Whilst these approaches also contribute to the understanding of 
social pedagogy and social work practice in Germany, they are not directly and substantially trying 
to describe what social pedagogy is. We therefore did not include them in our selection of 
approaches to be discussed below.3  
A first example of such a distinct theory is Michael Winkler’s ‘theory of social pedagogy’ (Winkler, 
1988; 1995; 2003). Unlike many other approaches within the German debate, Winkler’s approach 
clearly specifies what issues a theory of social pedagogy has to decide on before embarking 
(Winkler, 1988: 12). Above all, he explains, it has to decide on the level of investigation. Winkler’s 
theory itself states that social pedagogy is a reality that qualifies as such only through a specific 
discursive reflection (Winkler, 1988: 33; 1995: 108). This assumption has consequences for the 
way in which social pedagogy can be described, because it no longer anticipates social pedagogy as 
a static matter of fact but as an unsteady, contingent process, which has to be observed in a 
                                                        
 
3 There are more examples that could have been discussed here – for instance several German theories of social work 
which draw from sociological systems theory (Hünersdorf, 2009; Scherr, 1999). These examples are not principally 
excluded by our selection and have already been discussed in earlier publications (Neumann, 2008; Neumann and 
Sandermann, 2007). 
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different way. To achieve this, Winkler introduces the concept of ‘discourse’ as his main category 
for observing social pedagogy. Referring to post-ontological thoughts such as those of Wittgenstein 
and Foucault, Winkler describes the discourse of social pedagogy as finally and precisely what is 
‘real’ for its participants (Winkler, 1988: 31). Therefore, Winkler argues, he can firstly draw a 
theory of social pedagogy from this very discourse (Winkler, 2003: 11) and secondly use the 
discourse to outline the general idea of a theory of social pedagogy, i.e. an ‘epistemological 
dispositive’ of social pedagogy (Winkler, 1988: 19). So, what we can learn from Winkler’s approach 
is that, above all, social pedagogy is supposed to be a pedagogical discourse, which delivers both an 
object and a specific way of reification at the same time. 
As a second example, we refer to perhaps the most dominant theory of social pedagogy in 
contemporary Germany: the approach of lifeworld orientation. It has mainly been developed by 
Hans Thiersch (see Schugurensky, 2014) and his school of thought since the late 1970s and was 
initially called everyday orientation, referring to Karel Kosík’s (1976) thoughts on the dialectics of 
everyday life. Contrary to Winkler’s approach, the theory of a lifeworld oriented social pedagogy 
has not been developed systematically, but as a cumulative concept that has been renewed several 
times. Nonetheless, lifeworld orientation does not intend to offer a purely theoretical approach for 
analysing and describing social pedagogy and social work. It also claims to generate ideas for better 
social work practice (Thiersch, 2002: 128), like many other approaches do (see, for instance, our 
third and fourth example below). At the core of the lifeworld orientation approach, there is the 
assumption that social pedagogy is above all a practice of deep understanding of its clients’ 
subjective views and everyday life routines. The latter is relevant in two ways. First, the approach’s 
idea is that social pedagogy professionally identifies the individual life and coping strategies of its 
clients to understand their functionality as well as to distinguish between strategies that are more 
or less ‘working’ for the clients. Second, it aims to describe how the process of understanding itself 
opens up ways for social pedagogy to shape all relevant dimensions of the client’s everyday life: 
‘time, social environment and social relations [in order to] support everyday coping patterns in the 
struggle for a successful everyday’ (Grunwald and Thiersch, 2009: 131). 
The theory of social work as service (Otto and Schaarschuch, 1999) provides a third example of a 
rather influential theory of social pedagogy in the current German-speaking debate. Similar to the 
approach of lifeworld orientation, it has been developed and changed over decades by a whole 
school of scholars around Hans-Uwe Otto, a second prominent and influential figure in German 
academic social pedagogy standing next to Hans Thiersch. It basically describes social pedagogy as 
a ‘professional mode of action in the public sector of social service provision’ (Otto and 
Schaarschuch, 1999: 38). Focusing on general definitions of service provision in modern societies 
and those societal conditions that are specific to the field of social work, it aims to describe social 
pedagogy as a specific type of service provision that does not produce, but co-produces services 
that are primarily driven by the service’s clients. The normative core of this approach is obvious as 
it marks out critically the degree to which it has not (yet) been set into practice. The authors have 
marketed their approach as an advancement of lifeworld orientation (see, e.g., Flösser and Otto, 
1996). By embedding the approach in the historical development of theories of social pedagogy in 
Germany, the approach claims to represent an up-to-date description of the field it is aimed at. So, 
the approach outlines social pedagogy as a ‘dialectical relationship of professional and service user 
represented in the conceptualization of social work as service’ (Otto and Schaarschuch, 2009: 38). 
Fourthly, we can refer to an approach that expressly declares to include findings from sociology of 
knowledge in its concept of social pedagogy. Introduced into the German debate by Hans-Uwe Otto 
as an influential branch of profession theory, this approach characterizes social pedagogy as a 
‘reflexive profession’ (Dewe and Otto, 1996; Otto, Polutta and Ziegler, 2009; Dewe et al., 2011). In 
this sense, the approach argues that the core of social pedagogy lies in a reflexive dialogical process 
between social work practitioners and their clients based on, but not strictly limited by, 
organizational structures of social work, such as planning, administration and controlling. As a 
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reflexive professionalism, social pedagogy connects theory and practice of social work through 
dialogical case work (Dewe et al., 2011: 20-22). 
At first glance, the four approaches briefly described above seem to have very little in common. 
Although they all claim to represent the essential core of what social pedagogy is and in part seem 
to refer to each other, there are considerable differences in what they reify as social pedagogy. 
Winkler’s theory of social pedagogy sees social pedagogy as a particular academic and/or 
professional discourse that is able to describe and shape all social behaviour 
educationally/pedagogically and therefore provides both a specific epistemology and a specific 
reification of social pedagogy at the same time. Thiersch et al.’s approach of lifeworld orientation 
reifies social pedagogy as a practice of critical de- and reconstruction of the everyday life of social 
work clients. Otto et al. define social pedagogy as a dialectical relationship in which professional 
social workers offer services they only co-produce, whereas Dewe, Otto et al. declare social 
pedagogy to be a professionally and theoretically reflected dialogical process between 
professionals and clients. 
As a minimum commonality besides their obvious differences, all theories at hand seem to reify 
social pedagogy as something that is centred on some sort of theoretical reflection. The four 
approaches seem to focus on rather different research strands to avow social pedagogy as an object 
though. More precisely, it is hard to tell what the actual research base for most of the approaches is, 
as they all draw on theories from outside social pedagogy and apply these to a rather abstract idea 
of social pedagogy. Apart from Winkler, they do so without defining where exactly they intend to 
look for social pedagogy, which makes the way in which they reify social pedagogy rather 
exceptional for an academic discipline of the social sciences. Therefore the chosen ways of 
reification can be questioned per se from a social science perspective (Neumann and Sandermann, 
2008). 
On the other hand, if we take these findings seriously, they might provide a first step towards a 
meta-theory of dominant theories of social pedagogy in Germany. To take this first step though, it is 
helpful to assume that the lack of a clear object of social pedagogy is not primarily a problem of 
inadequate reification by the dominant theories at hand. Rather than that, it is foremost a problem 
of how theories of social pedagogy in Germany themselves have been observed to date. So far, it has 
been presupposed quite concordantly that there must be something like an objective identity of 
social pedagogy (Füssenhäuser, 2011a: 117). This identity has usually not been assumed as being a 
specific reification, but as being something objective, independent from reification, either 
determined by the ‘needs of the field itself’ or by a mere pluralism of ideas on the field (Dollinger, 
2013: 149). Through these two different, but nevertheless both deeply positivist assumptions, the 
idea has been cultivated that there has to be something unique ‘out there’ to be checked against the 
variety of theories of social pedagogy (Neumann and Sandermann, 2007). 
By virtue of this presupposition – that there is something which would pre-exist somewhere apart 
from its observation, still waiting for adequate identification – even usual synopses of theories of 
social pedagogy do not systematically treat the approaches they investigate as their research 
material. Instead, they either expect the approaches themselves to draw a unique picture of what 
social pedagogy is (see, critically, Dewe and Otto, 2011: 1741-1742), or they expect something 
outside of theory to verify those theories that are ‘correct’. Usual overviews of theoretical 
approaches on social pedagogy therefore at best reproduce rather than critically re-interpret their 
material, which leads to an unsolved variety of incommensurable approaches even on a meta-level 
(Füssenhäuser, 2011b). This applies even to meta-theoretical analyses, which plead, in a more 
relativistic sense, for accepting the diversity of theoretical knowledge production in social 
pedagogy as the ‘normal’ rather than a problematic state (Füssenhäuser, 2005, 2011; Wilhelm, 
2006) as they also refer to the supposedly heterogeneous and disparate reality of the field of social 
pedagogy in order to justify their argument (Neumann and Sandermann, 2007). 
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Given this assumption, we suggest an alternative way to meta-theoretically reify dominant theories 
of social pedagogy in Germany. In what follows, we submit a meta-theory of theories of social 
pedagogy, which is loosely based on Bourdieu’s epistemological approach of reflexive sociology 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Bourdieu 1996; 1998). Hereby, we hope to contribute to a more 
comprehensive understanding of theories of social pedagogy in Germany, as it is our declared aim 
to not only amplify the differences between the respective approaches we have sketched out above, 
but to first and foremost show what they also have in common. 
 
3. How to Think of Social Pedagogy as a Common Perspective 
Unlike many existing synopses on theories of social pedagogy and social work in Germany, 
Rauschenbach and Züchner (2011) are concerned with the attempt not only to describe the variety 
of existing approaches, but also to systematically categorize those approaches available. Their 
analysis is therefore capable of generating a sort of first step meta-theory of social pedagogy. To do 
this precisely, the authors refer to basic ideas of the philosophy of science in order to show some 
significant ambiguities in theory building, such as a contradiction between normative and analytical 
aims of theories of social pedagogy (Rauschenbach and Züchner, 2011: 168). We feel this basic 
finding is an important point in order to understand theories of social pedagogy in Germany. 
Rauschenbach and Züchner pursue their analysis by distinguishing between ‘more conceptual’ and 
‘more analytical’ theories of social pedagogy. In other words, the authors try to categorize the 
debate’s theoretical approaches through an identification of the degree to which they find 
normative tendencies within each theory of social pedagogy examined. This is certainly worthwhile 
for a more detailed understanding of each of the approaches. However, at the same time, such 
categorization does not lead the authors to a better understanding of what it is that ties theories of 
social pedagogy together as such. 
In place of this rationale, we argue that dominant German theories of social pedagogy may indeed 
vary in terms of their degree of normativity, but nevertheless show some clear commonality as far 
as they all show an ontological mode of reification. To give a brief definition of what we mean by 
‘ontological’, we refer to Luhmann (2012; 2013) and Bourdieu (1996), who assert that ontological 
observations are observations which produce something as an observable ‘fact’ through blurring 
the very process of observation that generated the fact as such. In other words, an ontological 
reification is a reification equipped with the idea of unquestionable knowledge. Such knowledge 
correlates with the idea of the respective object’s genuineness; the object ‘itself’ remains 
unaffected, no matter what the circumstances of observation may be. The empirical profile of any 
observed object is normatively verified through its identification right away, because each 
reification is strongly linked to normative assertions concerning the object, which have been 
enunciated beforehand. Thus ontological reifications harshly limit the contingency of the objects 
they identify (see Luhmann, 2013). They do not reflexively unfold the observational steps that lead 
to the research object they generate, but instead conceal those steps and claim ‘genuine’ facts as 
benchmarks for observational scopes. Therefore, ontological reifications operate in a highly 
normative manner without being obviously normative at first glance, as they do not actively 
introduce distinctions between normative and analytic manners of reasoning (see Bourdieu, 1996: 
295). In the end, such reification is thereby even able to transfer tensions between normative ideals 
and analytical findings into the reified object itself. What empirically exists becomes a deficient 
version of what could be. The latter can thus be presented as the more genuine object compared to 
what is directly observable. 
Such an ontological mode of reification, we argue, is what can be seen as a striking commonality of 
dominant theories of social pedagogy in Germany. Contrary to the usual assertion in the German-
language debate that there is no common idea of social pedagogy, and that because of this there 
cannot be any clear idea of what a theory of social pedagogy is either, our hypothesis reads as 
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follows: when examining the discourse on theories of social pedagogy in Germany it is possible to 
identify a clearly dominant, albeit more implicitly than explicitly driving idea of what a theory of 
social pedagogy is, as there is a certain mode of reification that prominent theoretical descriptions 
of social pedagogy have in common, even when they differ in terms of what their reifications of 
social pedagogy end up with as a result. 
To not only claim but empirically test our hypothesis, it would be necessary to observe the overall 
debate on theories of social pedagogy in Germany with a focus on processes of reification. As 
opposed to usual synopses, such an approach would – firstly – neither try to reify any common 
object nor any common subject (e.g., a typology of authors or schools) of theories of social 
pedagogy. Secondly, it would be interested in theories of social pedagogy but not in performing as a 
theory of social pedagogy, which means that it would be normatively detached from the problem of 
‘identity’ and therefore interested in differences and commonalities of theories of social pedagogy 
alike. At this point, we can only exemplify our argument on how these theories reify social 
pedagogy ontologically. 
We will do this using the example of the lifeworld orientation approach, which we have chosen this 
example as it has gained a lot of attention not only in Germany, but also abroad (see, e.g., various 
chapters in Cameron and Moss, 2011). In order to analyse the approach in terms of how it reifies 
social pedagogy, we firstly refer to an English quote by Klaus Grunwald and Hans Thiersch (2009), 
who can certainly be seen as the two main authors of this approach. They give us a brief definition 
of lifeworld orientation when they state: 
The term ‘lifeworld orientation’, here used as a synonym for ‘everyday orientation’, describes a 
conceptual framework for […] the two fields of German professional activity that […] are broadly 
equivalent to social work and social care. […] Social work and social care with a lifeworld 
orientation is a practical science […], in which theoretical discourses and models for practice 
develop in mutual reference, without one simply being derived from the other. (p. 131) 
When carefully dissecting this definition, we can already point at some findings regarding our 
research interest. We can observe that there is a double claim to represent a distinct ‘conceptual 
framework’ for social pedagogy on the one hand, and a ‘practical science’ of social pedagogy on the 
other. While it does not yet become entirely clear here, the approach seems only able to reach this 
goal by virtue of an ontological, or at least tautological, mode of reification. When Grunwald and 
Thiersch assert that it is ‘lifeworld orientation’ which ‘gives social pedagogy practice a concrete 
form’ as an ‘ideally’ definable version of ‘interpersonal action characterised by focused, problem-
solving actions, and by actions targeting the successful everyday’(p. 140), it becomes obvious that 
they reach the point where their tautological reasoning flows into ontology. Following Grunwald 
and Thiersch, social pedagogy and lifeworld orientation end up being the exact same thing. In other 
words, with Grunwald and Thiersch social pedagogy finds its true inner self only through lifeworld 
orientiation. 
There are also other sources that deliver findings for an ontological reification of lifeworld oriented 
social pedagogy. At the core of the lifeworld orientation approach is the idea that everyday life 
determines social reality, including the social reality that social pedagogy as a professional practice 
is presented with (see Thiersch, 2006: 43). A theory that reifies social pedagogy based on such an 
idea of a uniform social reality must conclude that all social pedagogy is ontologically situated 
within everyday life, even if it was a practice of social pedagogy that the lifeworld orientation 
approach would define as not lifeworld-oriented, but traditional, out-dated or ‘colonizing# 
(Thiersch, 2009: 25). If we accepted this ontological reification of everyday life though, that would 
mean that all social pedagogy, which does not follow a lifeworld orientation approach, either 
misconceives the social reality that surrounds it, or is not social pedagogy anyway. The ontological 
mode of reification becomes very clear at this point: the lifeworld orientation approach argues that 
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everyday life challenges and enables all ‘real’ social pedagogy to become a fully developed, i.e. 
lifeworld-oriented social pedagogy. 
Elsewhere, Thiersch describes the 20th century as a century of social pedagogy (see Thiersch, 2009: 
235-254). Here again, it becomes obvious how the lifeworld orientation approach employs an 
ontological mode of reification to generate social pedagogy as such. By virtue of a teleological 
argument, Thiersch reads the end of the 20th century in Germany as a time close to the acme of 
‘actual’ social pedagogy, because it is here and now that social pedagogy has come close to 
principles of lifeworld orientation: 
Today’s social pedagogy is the result of fundamental changes in our society’s structure and 
consciousness; changes that determine social pedagogy in terms of particular constellations and 
accountabilities. Yet while these historically contingent developments have shaped the image of 
social pedagogy, it becomes increasingly clear that they drift to take a coherent form, i.e. a form of 
social pedagogy, which is determined by one universal principle throughout its branched 
institutions and activities: the principle of lifeworld orientation. (Thiersch, 2009, p. 2394) 
We like to point out several findings referring to this quote. Firstly, the approach repeatedly 
suggests that there is not only a conceptual idea but also a social reality of lifeworld orientation. 
Secondly, it argues that this social reality of lifeworld orientation is the same as what can be called 
actual social pedagogy. Thirdly, this reification puts the normative idea of lifeworld orientation into 
a position from which it can decide on all matters of social pedagogy – or even social reality. We 
conclude that the lifeworld orientation approach always reifies social pedagogy as some merely 
normative entity, even where it claims to describe and explain it analytically. The approach is 
insofar ontological and anti-empirical, as it structurally ‘knows’ that practices of ‘real social 
pedagogy’ always aim at a lifeworld orientation approach. So, even when it identifies practices of 
social pedagogy that do not fit to the lifeworld orientation approach, the approach interprets those 
practices in a highly ontological manner as either still developing towards lifeworld orientation or 
as not being social pedagogy. 
We can only claim here that the three other approaches we sketched earlier in this paper reason in 
a very similar way (for a broader overview, see Neumann/Sandermann, 2007; Dollinger, 2013), 
although they end up with quite different reifications of social pedagogy (see 2). Even though they 
do not reify lifeworld orientation as ‘the core’ of social pedagogy but instead understand social 
pedagogy as a distinct pedagogical discourse (Winkler), a dialectical service relationship (Otto et 
al.), or a reflexive dialogue between clients and professionals that aims to merge theoretical 
knowledge, organizational preconditions, the client’s subjective interests and professional 
experience (Dewe, Otto et al.), they theorize social pedagogy in a very similar way, as something 
that is deeply bound to whatever normative idea the respective theory puts into the centre of its 
reification. Whether obviously supported by empirical findings or not, it is always this additional 
normative core idea that social pedagogy is linked to and has therefore to be centred at. 
With its specific mode of reification, theories of social pedagogy in Germany represent the 
ontological assumption that social work practice itself would already contain a best practice (see 
Bitzan, Bolay, and Thiersch, 2006), which can be identified both as the normative core idea of the 
respective theory of social pedagogy and as a thought that describes ‘real social work practice as it 
                                                        
 
4 Orig. German: ‘Heutige Sozialpädagogik ist das Ergebnis von prinzipiellen Veränderungen in Struktur und Bewußtsein 
unserer Gesellschaft, von Veränderungen, die die Sozialpädagogik in Form partikularer Konstellationen in ihren 
Zuständigkeiten und Abgrenzungen bestimmen. So sehr aber diese historisch kontingenten Entwicklungen das Bild 
geprägt haben und bis jetzt prägen, sie treiben zunehmend deutlicher auf eine in sich stimmige Gestalt hin, auf eine 
Sozialpädagogik nämlich, die in ihren verzweigten Institutionen und Aktivitäten bestimmt ist durch ein durchgängiges 
Prinzip, durch das Prinzip der Lebensweltorientierung.‘ (Thiersch, 2009, p. 239) 
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is actually meant to be’. Such an ontological assumption sets a benchmark for existing practice in 
practice itself. It also claims rules for the mode of theoretical knowledge production to be preferred 
by the academic discipline. In summary, this mode of reification functions both tautologically and 
anti-empirically, as it does not allow any further knowledge on practice out of what was already 
known about social pedagogy. 
 
Conclusion: Why do theories of social pedagogy in Germany work the way they 
work, and what can we learn from German theories of social pedagogy? 
We hope that our argument could demonstrate that there is a variety of social pedagogies, which 
theories of social pedagogy in Germany produce, but also a very common ontological mode of 
reification, which dominant theories of social pedagogy in Germany apply. In our paper, we could 
only exemplify how all of the dominant theories of social pedagogy introduced earlier in this paper 
reify social pedagogy. We suggest that it is exactly this ontological mode of reification of social 
pedagogy that all dominant theories of social pedagogy in Germany have in common. This mode 
holds serious consequences for how theoretical reasoning is cultivated in the academic discipline of 
social pedagogy in the German-speaking context, and it shapes the notion of the ‘usual way’ of 
theoretical knowledge production in social work practice. Through the ontological and thus self-
verifying mode of reification described above, dominant theories of social pedagogy in Germany 
manage to perform as authentic speakers in the name of ‘social work itself’. 
We argue that, by virtue of this, social pedagogy as an academic discipline aims to maintain the 
right to exclusively represent a variety of professional fields in academia. It appears evident that 
this miscellaneous ambition might be hazardous, as it relentlessly challenges both the rules of 
practice within academia and within the professional fields that theories of social pedagogy claim 
to represent. To use a popular phrase from the field as an allegory, we can say that theories of social 
pedagogy are constantly at risk of academic ‘burnout’, as – from the point of view of their neighbour 
disciplines, most notably sociology, psychology, and political sciences – they do not keep enough 
distance from the aspirations of the objects they work with. This might be one important reason 
why it is traditionally hard for social pedagogy in Germany to withstand academic critique from the 
interdisciplinary scientific community. 
This, however, does not mean that the dominant theories of social pedagogy developed in Germany 
so far have been ‘wrong’. We would like to emphasize that, in our opinion, it is not academically 
profitable simply to discredit the ontological mode of reification described above as some ‘bad 
academic practice’. While one can normatively judge ontological modes of reification as one sees fit, 
and refer to whatever code might be appropriate for this judgment, it is not our goal to do so here. 
Instead, we want to underline that what we have analysed so far can teach us much on the specific 
location of social pedagogy among the academic disciplines in Germany and the constraints for 
theory building that arise from this location. 
So, we would like to finish with an explanation for the mode of reification, which we have 
described. In order to do so, we will not provide a detailed historical contextualization of the debate 
on social pedagogy in Germany, although there might be convincing ways to explain how theories 
of social pedagogy in Germany and abroad have developed historically, e.g. via an approach of new 
historicism (see Gallagher and Greenblatt, 2001) or with the help of a transnational social work 
research approach (see Köngeter and Schröer, 2013). We would like to limit ourselves to a more 
basic sociological reflection so as to show a specific functionality of current theories of social 
pedagogy in Germany. 
Social pedagogy, since its beginnings at German universities in the 1920s and 30s, has had to have 
as its target a double recognition from both the academic and the professional field. As the number 
of academics involved in fulfilling this duty was quite small – and still is small when related to the 
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number of students and professionals that academic research and degree programmes of social 
pedagogy have to serve – it seems understandable that theoreticians have developed a basic idea of 
social pedagogy as an academic practice that has to deliver both descriptions of field practice and 
descriptions of better field practice at the same time. This idea is reflected in the circular structure 
that dominant theories of social pedagogy in today’s Germany show, as they try to answer this 
double purpose. The common ontological mode of reification that theories of social pedagogy show 
can therefore be seen as highly relevant, maybe even for understanding the ‘epistemic doxa’ 
(Bourdieu, 1998: 129) of Germany’s social pedagogy in general. 
A meta-perspective that highlights this doxa is, once again, no dismissive critique of social 
pedagogy. In fact it aims to show what similarities dominant theories of social pedagogy show 
besides their different reifications and how a more detailed analysis of these similarities might 
even depict how German social pedagogy works more generally. 
Maybe an interesting question is whether the meta-perspective we have tried to sketch out in this 
paper could be appropriate not only for theories of social pedagogy in modern Germany alone, but 
instead is suitable as a broader concept of how theories of social pedagogy in general, or even those 
theories of social work which are not associated with the idea of social pedagogy, are usually 
generated to gain the dual academic and professional recognition mentioned above. However, it 
would need wide and careful empirical research on theories of social work and social pedagogy 
beyond Germany to scrutinize this presumption. We would emphatically like to encourage such 
scrutiny. 
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